The Nizam-i Cedid (Turkish: Nizam-ı Cedid) was the reform movement that Selim III launched in 1792 and that came to an end in 1807. Its most visible part was the Nizam-i Cedid army, trained in the European manner, but the programme reached many institutions of the state, from finance to the engineering schools. Opposition from the Janissaries and the ulema (the religious scholars) halted the reform with the Kabakçı Revolt of 1807 and removed Selim III from the throne.
Quick Summary
- The term Nizam-i Cedid means “to give a new order”; in the reign of Selim III it came to denote the renewal of all institutions.
- Its starting point was the boycott of 1791, in which the army informed the sultan that it could not fight Russia.
- The Nizam-i Cedid army was trained in new barracks at the Levent Farm (Levent Çiftliği), in Üsküdar and in Anatolia.
- Its costs were met from the Irad-i Cedid Treasury (the Treasury of New Revenue), which was fed by new taxes.
- The Edirne Incident (Edirne Vak‘ası) of 1806 and the Kabakçı Revolt of 1807 brought the movement to an end.
- The Sekban-i Cedid (New Sekbans) experiment of 1808 served as a model for the steps Mahmud II took in 1826.
Contents
- What was the Nizam-i Cedid?
- Who launched it, when and why?
- How was the Nizam-i Cedid army formed?
- The costs and the Irad-i Cedid Treasury
- Innovations beyond the army
- Who opposed it, and why?
- The 1806 Edirne Incident and the 1807 Kabakçı Revolt
- The Sekban-i Cedid and the legacy left to Mahmud II
- Frequently asked questions

What Was the Nizam-i Cedid? The Meaning of the Term
According to the Nizam-i Cedid entry that Kemal Beydilli wrote for the TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, the term means “to give a new order”. The expression had been used before; for example, it was invoked for the reorganization of the jizya (the poll tax paid by non-Muslims) during the grand vizierate of Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha (1689–1691). In the reign of Selim III, however, the term came to describe not a reform in any single field but a far-reaching renewal of civil and military institutions. In this sense it was the opposite of the concept of “nizam-i kadim” (the old order), which described the established order.
Two definitions of the movement are commonly given: a narrow sense covering only the army, and a broad sense that also takes in civil institutions. Beydilli finds this distinction “misleading”, because the measures formed an interconnected whole. According to an observation by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha quoted in the entry, a modern institution that had been put in order could not be run with a civil administration that did not function well.
According to Beydilli, the concept was perceived in the light of developments in revolutionary France, in the Austria of Joseph II and in Poland, which proclaimed a constitution in 1791. In France, however, the revolution had erupted from below, whereas in the Ottoman state the reform was carried out from above by the sultan and reform-minded cadres. We discussed this context in our article on the effects of the French Revolution on the Ottoman state.
Who Launched the Nizam-i Cedid, When and Why?
The Nizam-i Cedid was launched by Selim III, who came to the throne on 7 April 1789. At the time, the wars with Russia and Austria that had begun in 1787 were going badly. According to the encyclopedia’s Janissary (Yeniçeri) entry, the army was routed at Măcin on 9 July 1791. On 11 August 1791 the leading men of the army and the government decided unanimously, despite the sultan’s firm orders, that the war with Russia could not be continued.
According to what the Janissary entry quotes from Cevdet Pasha, it was openly stated at the meeting that one could not stand up “to the infidel’s disciplined troops with our undisciplined troops”. The decision was reported to Istanbul in a mahzar (a collective petition). Kemal Beydilli regards these events as “an incident of boycott unprecedented in Ottoman history”.
The army’s weakness was nothing new. According to the Janissary entry, an inspection carried out in the 1780s found about 5,000 active soldiers in the corps, while the number of registered pensioners exceeded 40,000. Only a third of these were former Janissaries; the rest were servants of statesmen. Peace was signed at Jassy on 9 January 1792. After the army returned to Istanbul, those involved in the boycott, above all Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha, were dismissed.
While the army was still preparing to return, Selim III asked the leading dignitaries for layihas (memoranda) on the order of the state; the sources put the number of those who submitted one at twenty. According to the common view, the sultan wanted to share responsibility and forestall opposition. Beydilli, however, puts forward another interpretation, which he finds more accurate: by responding to the boycott document, Selim III had driven its signatories into a corner. They were thus forced to acknowledge in their own memoranda that reform was indispensable.
The reform was carried out by a small circle around the sultan. Among its members were Çelebi Mustafa Reşid, the first defterdar (treasurer) of the Irad-i Cedid, and the privy secretary Ahmed. The group, which at first numbered three, later grew to twelve and worked like a secret cabinet. The members of the divan (the imperial council) who had been left out, for their part, took a stand against the reforms from the very beginning.
How Was the Nizam-i Cedid Army Formed?
According to the Selim III entry, the sultan successfully pursued the task of building an army trained in the European style. Even so, the old corps such as the Janissaries, the cebecis (armourers) and the topçus (artillerymen) were not abolished; instead, attempts were made to reform them. This was because abolishing them was impossible before a new army capable of standing up to them had been prepared. In Beydilli’s words, circumstances forced Selim “to keep the old and the new alive side by side”.
According to the TDV Encyclopedia of Islam’s Bostancı entry, the Nizam-i Cedid army was attached to the Bostancı Ocağı, the corps of the bostancıs (palace guards), which was considered more loyal to the sultan. Because of the same loyalty, the first students of the engineering school (mühendishane) opened in the reign of Mahmud I had also been drawn from this corps. The Selimiye Barracks entry, likewise, refers to the barracks in Üsküdar as having been built for the “Muallem Bostani Neferatı”, that is, trained bostancı soldiers.
Where were the Nizam-i Cedid soldiers trained?
According to the encyclopedia’s Nizam-i Cedid entry, the foremost of the new barracks was the one at the Levent Farm; barracks were also built in Taksim, Üsküdar and Hasköy. In Anatolia, barracks for 1,000 men were set up in cities such as Aydın, Kayseri and Kastamonu, and barracks for 2,000 men in cities such as Ankara and Bolu. The Selimiye Barracks in Üsküdar was built in 1800–1803. According to the Selimiye Barracks entry, Selim III had it built as the spatial expression of the new order in the military sphere.
Foreign experts were also used in training. According to the Selim III entry, the collapse of the monarchy in France had put many unemployed officers on the market. Selim III did not hesitate to employ these experts, including as instructors of the drilled troops. A band of buglers and drummers had also been formed for the daily drills.

Was the Nizam-i Cedid army successful in war?
According to the Selim III entry, by the time France withdrew from Egypt in 1802, the successes of the disciplined troops sent to the front, few as they were, had become evident. According to the Kabakçı Revolt entry, the number of Nizam-i Cedid soldiers in Istanbul exceeded 10,000 in 1807. According to the Janissary entry, however, Selim III was unable to use this army, which he had prepared at great expense, either in war or to protect his own rights.
Where Did the Money for the New Army Come From? The Irad-i Cedid
According to Beydilli, financing the reforms was the most important issue of the movement and one of the main causes of the opposition. The Irad-i Cedid Treasury was set up for this purpose, and the expenses of the new military organization were to be met from it. Mukataas (state revenue sources farmed out to contractors) with an annual income of more than 30 kese (purses), as well as the revenues of timar holders who had not taken part in the recent wars, were transferred to this treasury.
New taxes were also introduced: the resm-i zecriyye on alcoholic drinks, a levy on wool and goat hair, and taxes on cotton, cotton yarn, gallnuts and currants. As a result, the treasury’s revenue for the year 1797–98 reached 64,500 kese. But as the army grew, the people’s tax burden increased, and the confiscation of timars displeased broad sections of society. The Selim III entry describes this treasury office (defterdarlık) as an institution “hated as the source of extraordinary taxation”.
Beyond the Army: Engineering Schools, a Printing Press and the Navy
The reform was not confined to the infantry. The Imperial Naval Engineering School (Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun), founded in 1775, was reformed, and in 1795 the Imperial Land Engineering School (Mühendishane-i Berri-i Hümayun) opened in Hasköy. According to Beydilli, the founding of this school was linked to the organization of the Nizam-i Cedid army; Hasköy, too, had been chosen to prevent contact with the Janissaries. The printing press opened at the school in 1797 was all the more important because there was no other Turkish press at the time.
A large dock was built at the naval arsenal (Tersane), and a fleet more agile and faster than the Russian warships was constructed. According to Beydilli, this effort was largely successful, but just as costly. Attempts were also made to use the permanent embassies opened in London, Paris, Berlin and Vienna to find experts. You can read about other Ottoman reform initiatives in our article on Ottoman sultans and reform movements.
Who Opposed the Nizam-i Cedid, and Why?
According to the Selim III entry, the first opponents to take a stand against the innovations emerged with the inspection of the timars. The measures taken in the old corps also largely closed off sources of profit, and the attempt to introduce modern training and discipline provoked a reaction. According to the Janissary entry, the Nizam-i Cedid army was at first met with silence, but over time a relentless hostility developed between the two systems. The gulf between the old corps, whose pay was neglected, and the privileged new institutions also deepened.
The opposition also had a broad social base. According to the Selim III entry, nearly half of the population of Istanbul was registered in the Janissary rolls and drew pay without performing any service. The Janissaries, who were seen as the victims of the reforms, succeeded in winning the ulema over to their side.
Beydilli sees 1805 as a turning point for the movement. The reforms were increasingly portrayed as bid‘at (reprehensible innovation in religion), oppression and “gâvurlaşma” (becoming like the infidels). The tension was reflected even in ceremonies. According to the Janissary entry, as the Selimiye Mosque was being opened for worship on 5 April 1805, a rumour spread that the new soldiers would salute the sultan, and the opening was cancelled. Beydilli also notes that the accusation that the reformers had grown rich was greatly exaggerated.
The 1806 Edirne Incident and the 1807 Kabakçı Revolt
Resistance in Rumelia: The 1806 Edirne Incident
In 1806 Selim III decided to extend the new military order to Rumelia as well. Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha, with the Nizam-i Cedid forces under his command, met fierce opposition in Silivri, Tekirdağ and Çorlu. There were armed clashes with the ayans (provincial notables), and the covert support that Grand Vizier Hafız İsmail Pasha gave the opponents also had an effect. The attempt ended in the Edirne Incident, and the measure was cancelled.
The Kabakçı Revolt entry calls this event the “II. Edirne Vak‘ası” (Second Edirne Incident), whereas the encyclopedia’s entry on the Edirne Incident deals with the revolt of 1703. Then, to appease the opposition, Selim appointed İbrahim Hilmi Agha, the agha of the Janissaries, as grand vizier on 14 November 1806. Topal Ataullah Mehmed Efendi, one of the implacable enemies of the innovations, also became Shaykh al-Islam. Beydilli regards this development as the beginning of the end.
How did the Kabakçı Revolt unfold?
In February 1807 the British fleet appeared off Istanbul, and the blockade led to scarcity and high prices. According to the Selim III entry, the anger that had built up against the reforms thus reached the point of explosion. When the army set out on campaign against Russia on 12 April 1807, an opportunity for revolt arose. According to the Kabakçı Revolt entry, those who directed the revolt behind the scenes were the deputy grand vizier (sadaret kaymakamı) Köse Musa Pasha and the Shaykh al-Islam Topal Ataullah Mehmed Efendi.
The attempt to bring the yamaks (auxiliary troops) of the Bosphorus fortresses into the new system gave Köse Musa Pasha the opportunity to incite them covertly. On 25 May 1807 the rebellious yamaks killed Mahmud Raif Efendi, the Inspector of the Bosphorus (Boğaz Nazırı), and Halil Haseki. Köse Musa Pasha’s schemes prevented the drilled troops at the Levent Farm from intervening, and the sultan was deceived with misleading information. Kabakçı Mustafa, who appeared at the head of the uprising, was a Janissary from Kastamonu.
Selim III, who did not use the thousands of trained soldiers at his disposal, sacrificed the statesmen the rebels demanded and agreed to the abolition of the reforms. Even so, the revolt did not stop, and on 29 May 1807 Mustafa IV was placed on the throne. A hüccet-i şer‘iyye (a deed issued by a sharia court) drawn up on 31 May guaranteed that the rebels would not be called to account.
According to Beydilli, the most important factor in the revolt’s success was the weakness of character that left the sultan unable to use his regular forces even at the last moment. Beydilli also considers the possibility of a hidden Russian and British hand “serious enough not to be ignored”. We examined the common causes of similar uprisings in our article on rebellions in the Ottoman Empire and their causes.

The Sekban-i Cedid and the Legacy Left to Mahmud II
Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the ayan of Rusçuk (Ruse), came to Istanbul to restore Selim III to the throne. But when the palace was entered on 28 July 1808, Selim had already been killed; Mahmud was rescued with difficulty and ascended the throne as Mahmud II. Alemdar, who became grand vizier, founded the Sekban-i Cedid that same year to replace the abolished Nizam-i Cedid army.
According to Abdülkadir Özcan’s Sekban-i Cedid entry, the new army was organized in the form of the long-familiar sekban companies so as not to provoke the Janissaries. It soon reached 4,000 men and on 3 October 1808 began training in the Levent and Üsküdar barracks. In November 1808, however, the Janissaries rose up and stormed the Sublime Porte; Alemdar died in this revolt, and the barracks were burned. The experiment, which had lasted about three months, thus came to an end.
According to the Selim III entry, the fact that the modern-trained Egyptian forces put down the Greek uprising, under way since 1821, within five or six months restored Selim’s standing among the people. According to Özcan, the Sekban-i Cedid experiment, too, provided a good example for Mahmud II, who took action in June 1826. You can read how this process ended in our article explaining why the Janissary Corps was abolished.
Some of the movement’s institutions, however, survived. According to Beydilli, the Mühendishane-i Berri is the original nucleus of Istanbul Technical University and of the Harbiye Mektebi (the Military Academy). The Selimiye Barracks, burned in 1808, was also rebuilt and opened on 27 January 1829.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who founded the Nizam-i Cedid army?
The Nizam-i Cedid army was founded by Selim III. The reform began immediately after the Treaty of Jassy in 1792. Affairs were managed by a small circle around the sultan; Çelebi Mustafa Reşid was both the defterdar of the Irad-i Cedid and the nazır (superintendent) of the drilled troops.
Are “Nizam-ı Cedit” and “Nizam-ı Cedid” the same thing?
Yes, the only difference is the spelling. Both spellings appear side by side in the bibliographies of the TDV Encyclopedia of Islam. For example, the title of Enver Ziya Karal’s 1946 work uses the spelling “Nizam-ı Cedit”, while the title of his 1947 work uses “Nizam-ı Cedid”.
Why was the Nizam-i Cedid abolished?
Heavy taxes, the confiscation of timars and the neglect of the old corps gave rise to broad opposition. The Janissaries and the ulema took a common stand against the reforms. During the Kabakçı Revolt of 1807, Selim III accepted the rebels’ demand and abolished the reforms, but he could not save his throne.
Conclusion
Selim III’s reform was a fifteen-year experiment that began with a military boycott and ended with a revolt. In this period important works such as the engineering schools, the printing press and a new navy came into being. But its reliance on a narrow circle, heavy taxes and the sultan’s indecision at the critical moment prepared its end.
According to the Kabakçı Revolt entry, the fact that the era of renewal remained closed until 1826 was one of the main causes of the state’s later difficulties. According to Beydilli, the military sphere had been the most important field into which European technology was transferred. Even so, the Nizam-i Cedid left behind an important body of experience for Mahmud II’s later military reforms.
Sources
- TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, entry “Nizâm-ı Cedîd” (New Order)
- TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, entry “Selim III”
- TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, entry “Kabakçı İsyanı” (Kabakçı Revolt)
- TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, entry “Sekbân-ı Cedîd”
- TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, entry “Yeniçeri” (Janissary)
- TDV Encyclopedia of Islam, entry “Mühendishâne-i Berrî-i Hümâyun” (Imperial Land Engineering School)